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INTRODUCTION
On May 14, 1988, after consuming numerous beers and vodka,
thirty-four-year-old factory worker Larry Mahoney was traveling north
in the southbound lane of Interstate 71 in Carrollton, Kentucky.1 At ap-
proximately 10:55 PM, Mahoney's Toyota pickup truck struck a church
bus returning from an amusement park and ruptured its unprotected
sixty-gallon gasoline tank, engulfing the bus in flames.2 Twenty-seven
people died and thirty-four were injured in what is still the deadliest
drunk driving accident in United States history.3 More than two decades
after the Carrollton bus crash, twenty-nine people daily and approxi-
mately ten thousand annually lose their lives as a result of driving under
the influence. 4
Driving under the influence is an unquestionably serious concern-
thousands of lives and over a hundred billion dollars are lost every year
due to motorists consuming alcohol and other intoxicating substances
before getting behind the wheel. 5 States realized the dangers of drunk
driving after the automobile came into popular use in the early part of the
twentieth century and passed laws which made it illegal to drive while
intoxicated. 6 At first, police officers and prosecutors relied on physical
signs of intoxication, such as stumbling and slurred speech.7 Eventually,
after consulting with medical experts, states outlawed driving with above
a certain blood alcohol content (BAC).8 To measure a suspect's BAC, a
police officer could directly analyze the suspect's blood or, less popu-
larly, urine.9 The most common and economic method, however, is to
measure the amount of alcohol in a person's breath using a device known
as a breathalyzer. 10
1 Daily Mail Reporter, Survivors of Deadliest Drunk Driving Crash in U.S. History Still
Bear Scars 25 Years after 27 were Killed in Horrific Bus Fire, DAILY MAIL, May 15, 2013,
12:18 AM) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2324709/Carrollton-bus-crash-25-years-
deadliest-drunk-driving-crash-history-killed-27.html.
2 Jack Brammer, Survivors of Carrollton Bus Crash Face the Inferno Again in Docu-
mentary Film, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 3, 2013, 5:52 PM) http://www.kentucky
.com/news/hot-topics/article44422317.html.
3 Id.
4 NHTSA, DOT HS 812 456, 2016 FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW
(2017); NHTSA, Drunk Driving, 2017, https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunk-driving
(last visited Nov. 1, 2017).
5 Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), MADD's FIFTH ANNIVERSARY REPORT TO
THE NATION: CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE DRUNK DRIVING (2011).
6 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2167 (2016).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 2170, n.1. While BAC may be determined by testing a subject's urine, urine tests
appear to be less common in drunk-driving cases than breath and blood tests, and none of the
cases consolidated in Birchfield involve a urine test.
10 Id. at 2167-68.
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Although the suspect's cooperation is not necessary for a blood
draw," a breath test, which requires the suspect to breathe out alveolar
air into a mouthpiece that connects to the breathalyzer, necessitates the
suspect's cooperation. 12 To ensure cooperation, individual states, begin-
ning with New York in 1953, implemented implied consent laws; these
laws provided that by exercising the privilege of driving on public roads,
suspected drunk drivers must submit to BAC testing.13 When the Su-
preme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota in 2016, all fifty states
had some variety of implied consent laws in place. 14 Soon after the states
adopted implied consent laws, a problem arose: if the penalties for repeat
violations or a significantly-elevated BAC exceeded the penalty for re-
fusing BAC testing, a suspected drunk driver had an incentive to simply
refuse the test and take the lesser punishment.'5 As a result, states aug-
mented the consequences for refusing testing, and several states went as
far as to enact statutes codifying refusal to submit to testing as a separate
criminal offense. 16 At least based on the decreased number of deaths due
to drunk driving, these measures were successful. 17 Then came the
Birchfield decision, which critics fear may undermine the effect of im-
plied consent laws. 18
The Court held in Birchfield v. North Dakota that a police officer
can administer a warrantless breath test to a suspected drunk driver as a
search incident to arrest, but not a blood draw. 19 Additionally, the Court
struck down implied consent laws to the extent they criminalized refusal
to submit to blood testing, but otherwise upheld implied consent laws. 20
Overall, the Birchfield decision is a compromise-one side, as exempli-
fied by dissenting Justice Sotomayor, argued that police officers should
secure warrants before performing both blood and breath tests. 21 The
other side, as exemplified by dissenting Justice Thomas, believed the 4th
amendment does not require a warrant in either circumstance. 22
The impact of the Birchfield decision will be substantial on implied
consent laws, which will inevitably have to be altered to eliminate sec-
'' Id.
12 Id. at 2168.
13 Penn Lerblance, Implied Consent in Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 54 ST.
JoHN's L.REv. 39, 47-48.
14 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2169.
15 Id.; Steven Oberman, Blood or Breath in Birchfield: The Supreme Court Draws a
Critical Distinction, 40 CHAMPION 47, 47 (2016).
16 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2169.
17 NHTSA, DOT HS 812 231, ALCOHOL IMPAiRED Divm r (2015).
18 See Steven Oberman, supra note 15, at 49.
19 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.
20 See id at 2185-86.; Oberman, supra note 15, at 49.
21 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187-96 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
22 See id. at 2196-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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tions threatening criminal punishment for refusing blood draws. Birch-
field will likely also encourage more police departments to rely on breath
tests in determining BAC, incentivizing the development of more cost-
effective and accurate breathalyzer machines. In the end, police officers
will most likely continue to rely on consent for most searches incident to
a traffic stop, including both breath and blood tests. Whether Birchfield's
somewhat unique approach, considering the level of intrusiveness of a
particular search to determine if the warrant requirement may be waived,
will be incorporated in future cases remains to be seen.
Accordingly, this Note will address several key questions that arose
in the aftermath of Birchfield. For example, how will state legislatures
respond to the part of the decision striking down criminal penalties for
refusing a blood draw? How will police officers modify their behavior
when responding to a suspected DUI? What are some viable alternatives
to implied consent laws to discourage drunk driving? Where does Birch-
field fit into the greater scope of bodily integrity jurisprudence and crimi-
nal procedure?
This Note will attempt to answer these questions using Birchfield
and its predecessors, current implied consent laws, and statistics and data
regarding DUI stops and police practices. Part I explores the progression
of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the warrant require-
ment, specifically relating to bodily intrusions. Part II summarizes the
key facts and holding of Birchfield, including the dissenting opinions.
Finally, Part III attempts to answer the questions posed earlier and ulti-
mately predicts what the ramifications of the court's decision in Birch-
field will be.
1. WARRANTS AND SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads,
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."'2 3 Both blood draws and breathalyzer
tests have been held to be searches under the Fourth Amendment.2 4 Gen-
erally, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless one of the ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement applies.25 Recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement that are relevant to this discussion are the search
incident to arrest and exigent circumstances.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989).
25 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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A. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception to the Warrant
Requirement
In Chimel v. California, the Court articulated the exception to the
warrant requirement for a search incident to arrest. 26 Police confronted
petitioner Ted Chimel at his house and arrested him for an alleged bur-
glary.2 7 Police asked Chimel for permission to look around, which he
refused to give.2 8 Despite this, police still conducted a search of the en-
tire house and seized incriminating evidence. 29 The Chimel Court ulti-
mately held the search to be unreasonable because it extended beyond
the area within Chimel's immediate control.30 The Court further articu-
lated the modem search incident to arrest exception to the warrant re-
quirement, holding that the exception is justified to protect officer safety
("remove any weapons that the latter may seek to use"), and relevant for
the purposes of this Note, to "seize any evidence on the arrestee' s person
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction."'31 Evidence of alcohol
consumption is naturally "destroyed" shortly after one stops drinking;
BAC percentage diminishes by approximately 0.015 to 0.02 per hour.32
Despite this, the Court has since held that valid searches incident to ar-
rest do not include searches beyond the body's surface. 33
B. Exigent Circumstances Exception
Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require-
ment, when the police are placed in a situation that requires them to act
immediately or risk either imminent danger to themselves or the destruc-
tion of evidence, the warrant requirement is excused.34 The prerequisites
for a warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception are:
1) circumstances presented the police with a sufficiently compelling ur-
gency, and 2) police had probable cause to believe items relating to the
crime (e.g. high BAC) would be found.35 Warrantless minor bodily intru-
sions have generally been upheld if the above elements have been met.
For example, in Cupp v. Murphy, the Court upheld the warrantless ex-
traction of scrapings underneath the suspect's fingernails because police
26 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
27 Id. at 753.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See id. at 768.
31 See id. at 762-63.
32 Jordan D. Santo, Waiting Is Warranted: Giving Meaning to the Supreme Court's Rul-
ing in Missouri v. McNeely, 24 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 247, 261-62 (2014).
33 Paul Clark, Do Warrantless Breathalyzer Tests Violate the Fourth Amendment? 44
N.M. L. RFv. 89, 91 (2014).
34 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
35 Crim. Pro. E&E, at 140.
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had probable cause to believe that the suspect had just strangled his wife,
and the suspect could have easily washed away the dried blood.36
1. Schmerber v. California
Schmerber v. California was one of the main precedent cases in-
volving the exigent circumstances exception that the Court in Birchfield
considered. 37 Armando Schmerber was involved in an automobile acci-
dent, arrested under suspicion of driving under the influence, and taken
to a hospital to receive medical treatment due to the resulting injuries. 38
Despite Schmerber's refusal to consent to a blood draw and the police
lacking a warrant, a physician extracted a blood sample at the direction
of a police officer.39 The Court ultimately held the search to be constitu-
tional under the exigent circumstances exception, explaining that the of-
ficer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an
emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the
circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence. '40 To support its
reasoning, the Court noted that evidence could have been lost because
"the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after
drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system."4 1
The Court in Schmerber concluded that the search was reasonable
overall, emphasizing the "commonplace" nature of the blood test.4 2 The
court viewed the blood draw as a minimal intrusion which involved "no
risk, trauma, or pain."'43 Critics believe that the decision rested on the
subjective feelings of the justices, who did not view blood tests as seri-
ous bodily intrusions.44 The Court in Birchfield explicitly rejected this
conclusion, holding that "blood draws are significant bodily
intrusions. '45
2. Missouri v. McNeely
Prior to Birchfield, the most recent case relating to warrantless
searches of suspected drunk drivers was Missouri v. McNeely. A police
officer stopped McNeely after observing him repeatedly drive over the
centerline at an excessive speed.46 The police officer placed McNeely
36 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973).
37 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173-74.
38 Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 758-59 (1966).
39 Id. at 758-59, 765-66.
40 Id. at 770.
41 Id.
42 Clark, supra note 33, at 92.
43 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
44 See Clark, supra note 33, at 92.
45 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569
U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
46 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 145.
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under arrest after McNeely, who performed poorly on field-sobriety
tests, refused to undergo a preliminary breath test.47 The police officer
initially planned to take McNeely to the police station to provide a breath
sample, but decided instead to take McNeely to a nearby hospital for a
blood draw. 48 At the hospital, the arresting officer read to McNeely Mis-
souri's implied consent law, alerting McNeely that if he refused the
blood draw, McNeely would immediately lose his driver's license for
one year and that the refusal could be used against him in court. 49 De-
spite the possible consequences, McNeely still refused to consent to the
blood draw.50 The police officer, however, ignored McNeely's refusal
and directed a hospital lab technician to take a blood sample; the officer
did not first obtain a search warrant. 51 McNeely's BAC was measured at
0.154, almost double the legal limit of 0.08.52 McNeely was subse-
quently charged with driving while intoxicated, which he appealed, argu-
ing that taking his blood without a warrant violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. 53
Missouri urged the Court to adopt a per se rule that because alcohol
is naturally metabolized by the body, an exigent circumstance exists
which excuses the warrant requirement.54 The Court disagreed, instead
holding that, "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving sus-
pect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality
of the circumstances. ' ' 55 The court emphasized that unlike in Schmerber,
where the police officer expended time to transport the suspect to a hos-
pital for treatment and investigate the scene of the crime, arguably leav-
ing no time to secure a warrant, the facts in McNeely corresponded with a
routine DUI stop. 56 Thus, the court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
requires a police officer to obtain a warrant before drawing a blood sam-
ple, unless obtaining the warrant would "significantly undermin[e] the
efficacy of the search." '57
McNeely explicitly contradicted the Court's view in Schmerber that
blood tests are minimal intrusions. 58 The McNeely Court instead empha-
sized that drawing blood was a particularly intrusive type of search:
"Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual's most per-
47 Id.
48 Id. at 145-46.
49 Id. at 146 (referencing Mo. ANN. STAT. §§577.020.1, 577.041 (West 2011)).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Missouri § 577.012.1.
53 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 146.
54 Id. at 163-64.
55 Id. at 156.
56 Id. at 151-52.
57 Id. at 153.
58 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
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sonal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy."'59 Prior to Birchfield, it
was unclear how a search's level of intrusiveness affected the legal anal-
ysis. The black letter law was that a warrantless search-no matter how
benign-was per se unreasonable unless a recognized exception ap-
plied.60 Critics dismissed the Court's emphasis of the intrusiveness of
blood tests as merely dicta that "only confuses the legal analysis. '61 Nev-
ertheless, the Court's analysis of the level of intrusiveness of blood tests
compared to breath tests in McNeely was prophetically crucial to the
Court's subsequent decision in Birchfield.
II. BIRCHFIELD V. NORTH DAKOTA
A. Facts of the Case
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court consolidated three separate
cases: State v. Birchfield, State v. Bernard, and Beylund v. Levi.62 The
main issue that the Court sought to address was whether "motorists law-
fully arrested for drunk driving may be convicted of a crime or otherwise
penalized for refusing to take a warrantless test measuring the alcohol in
their bloodstream. '63 In the first case, Danny Birchfield drove his car off
a North Dakota highway and into a ditch. 64 While Birchfield unsuccess-
fully attempted to get his car out of the ditch, a police officer approached
Birchfield, noticed signs of inebriation, and requested that Birchfield per-
form several field sobriety tests, which he failed.65 Birchfield subse-
quently consented to a roadside breath test,6 6 which officers use in North
Dakota solely to determine if further testing is necessary. 67 The roadside
breath test estimated that Birchfield's BAC was more than three times
the legal limit, leading the responding officer to arrest Birchfield.68
After arresting Birchfield, the police officer read to Birchfield North
Dakota's implied consent statute, informing him that refusing to undergo
chemical testing is a criminal offense. 69 Nevertheless, Birchfield refused
to let his blood be drawn, later arguing unsuccessfully in state court that
the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibited North Dakota from criminalizing his refusal to
59 Clark, supra note 33, at 98-99 (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148).
60 See id.
61 Id. at 99.
62 Oberman, supra note 15, at 47.
63 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2172 (2016).
64 Id. at 2170.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 N.D. CENT. CODE, § 39-20-14 (2017).
68 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170.
69 Id.
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submit to the test. 70 Birchfield was subsequently sentenced to thirty days
in jail, one year of unsupervised probation, mandatory participation in a
sobriety program, and $1,750 in fines and fees. 71
In State v. Bernard, three men attempted to retrieve their boat from
a river and got their truck stuck in the process. 72 Witnesses told the re-
sponding police officers that a man in underwear, William Robert Ber-
nard, Jr., was the one who drove the truck.73 Police noticed Bernard
exhibited various signs of intoxication and arrested him for driving while
impaired.74
Police transported Bernard to the police station where they read to
him Minnesota's implied consent advisory, which like North Dakota's,
informs the suspect that refusal to undergo a BAC test is a crime.75 Ber-
nard declined to take a breath test despite knowing the consequences of
his refusal. Prosecutors charged Bernard, who had four prior impaired-
driving convictions, 76 with first-degree test refusal, which carries a
mandatory minimum three-year prison sentence.7 7 Although the district
court notably dismissed the charges against Bernard, holding that the
Fourth Amendment protects defendants against warrantless breath
tests,78 both the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme
Court disagreed and reinstated the charges.79
Last, in Beylund v. Levi, a police officer in North Dakota saw peti-
tioner Michael Beylund nearly strike a stop sign while attempting to turn
into a driveway. 80 When the responding officer approached Beylund's
stopped car, he smelled alcohol and noticed an empty wine glass in the
center console. 81 The officer arrested Beylund and took him to a nearby
hospital, where he read to Beylund North Dakota's implied consent advi-
sory.82 Beylund agreed to have his blood drawn; the subsequent analysis
of Beylund's blood revealed a BAC of 0.25.83
Following an administrative hearing, Beylund relinquished his
driver's license for two years. 84 Beylund later appealed his license sus-
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2171.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 MINN. STAT. §169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2014).
76 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2171.
77 MIN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1 (2017).
78 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2171.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2171-72.
81 Id. at 2172.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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pension, arguing that he only consented to the blood draw after the of-
ficer informed him that refusing to consent was illegal. 85 Both the state
district court and North Dakota Supreme Court rejected Beylund's
argument.86
To summarize, the three separates cases the Supreme Court consoli-
dated in Birchfield v. North Dakota had several key similarities and dif-
ferences. Petitioners Birchfield and Beylund both faced blood draws
following DUI arrests in North Dakota, while Bernard was told he had to
submit to a breath test in Minnesota. 87 Both Birchfield and Bernard re-
fused to consent to a BAC test, and both were convicted of a crime as a
result. 88 In contrast, Beylund consented (which he later challenged) to a
blood draw, which revealed a high BAC; Beylund consequently received
civil penalties including license suspension. 89
B. Majority Opinion
Before Birchfield, the Court traditionally employed a balancing test
to determine whether a particular type of search was exempt from the
warrant requirement. 90 The Court in Birchfield did partially rely on the
balancing test, derived from the Katz decision,91 which weighs the pri-
vacy interest of an individual against the necessity of the intrusion to
promote governmental interests.92 Yet, in a somewhat unexpected turn,
the Birchfield Court then explicitly modified the traditional Katz test by
looking at the degree of intrusiveness of the search in question.93 The
Court acknowledged that the people who ratified the Fourth Amendment
in 1791 likely did not contemplate searches of modern technology such
as cellphones94 or any variant of a BAC test.95 The Court reasoned that
to determine whether a warrant is required for a search that involves
modern technology not present in the founding era, courts should balance
"the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy"
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See id. at 2170-72.
88 See id.
89 Id.
90 Oberman, supra note 15, at 48.
91 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan's phrasing of the Court's rule, that a person is protected by the Fourth Amendment
from unreasonable searches when the person has "exhibited an actual expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,"'
has since been popularly known as the Katz test.
92 See id.; Oberman, supra note 15, at 48.
93 Oberman, supra note 15, at 48.
94 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (holding that police officers
must generally secure a warrant before searching a cellphone).
95 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016).
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with "the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
government interests."'96
To assess the degree of intrusiveness of each test, the Court consid-
ered the actual process of obtaining the sample, the extent of the physical
intrusion, the nature of the sample obtained, and the potential evidence
available in the sample. 97 First, in regards to breath tests, the Court rea-
soned that the physical intrusion is insignificant.98 The only physical in-
trusion involved in a breath test is a mouthpiece that is inserted in-
between the suspect's lips.99 Second, considering the nature of the sam-
ple, the Court noted that people normally do not have a possessory inter-
est or any emotional attachment to the air in their lungs. 1°° Furthermore,
a person cannot hold his or her breath indefinitely, and all the air that is
blown out during a breath test will be exhaled eventually even without
the test. 1 1
The Court reasoned that breath tests, unlike blood tests, are capable
of revealing only one bit of information: the amount of alcohol in the
suspect's breath. 10 2 Additionally, the Court contrasted what remained
with the police after the completion of each test, noting that after an
officer administers a breath test, the officer does not retain a sample of
the suspect's DNA. 10 3 Last, the Court asserted that the actual process of
obtaining a breath sample is minimally intrusive.' 04 The Court noted that
breath tests are unlikely to increase the embarrassment inherent in any
arrest, since such tests are usually conducted out of the public view.105
Thus, the Court held that a breath test does not "implicat[e] significant
privacy concerns."'10 6
The Court reasoned that blood tests, which require piercing the sus-
pect's skin with a foreign object and extracting a part of the suspect's
body, are significantly more intrusive than breath tests.10 7 The court
noted that unlike air, which people regularly exhale, blood is not natu-
rally shed by the body without outside intervention. 10 8 In addition, the
Court theorized that the government could retain the blood sample for
96 Id. at 2176 (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484).
97 See id. at 2176-78; Oberman, supra note 15, at 48.
98 See Birchfield at 2176.
99 Id.
100 See id. at 2177.
101 Id; see JOHN E. HALL, GUYTON AND HALL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY
519-20 (13th ed. 2016).
102 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)).
107 See id. at 2178.
108 See id.
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future use, even if the police are expressly forbidden from testing the
blood for any purpose other than to measure BAC. 109
Next, the Court conducted a traditional Katz analysis of the govern-
ment's interest in obtaining BAC readings for drunk driving suspects.110
The Court highlighted that alcohol consumption is a leading cause of
automobile-related fatalities and injuries, noting that a person is killed
because of drunk driving approximately every fifty-three minutes.111
Thus, the Court concluded that the government has a compelling interest
in both maintaining the safety of public highways and deterring drunk
driving. 112
Ultimately, the Court issued a controversial two-part opinion.1 13 Re-
lying on both the traditional Katz test and degree of intrusiveness analy-
sis, the Court held that warrantless breath tests are permitted incident to
arrests for drunk driving. 114 The Court reasoned that "the impact of
breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is
great." 115 In contrast, the Court ruled that police must secure a warrant
before demanding that a suspect provide a blood sample. 1
16
The Court then readdressed the constitutionality of implied consent
laws specifically relating to blood draws. 117 Although the Court reaf-
firmed its support for the general idea of implied consent laws, the Court
cautioned that the punishment motorists may be subject to must have a
limit. 118 The Court struck down the imposition of criminal sanctions for
refusal to submit to a blood draw, concluding that a motorist cannot le-
gitimately consent to a blood test if threatened with another criminal
charge for refusing to consent.1 19 Despite this analysis, the Court some-
what incongruously not only upheld criminal sanctions for refusing to
submit to a breath test but also declined to limit the punishment that
motorists who refuse such a test can receive.12 0
C. Dissenting Opinions
Justices Sotomayor and Thomas's dissenting opinions represent op-
posite ends of the debate on whether a warrant is necessary to perform a
search incident to an arrest for driving under the influence. Justice
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 See id. at 2179.
113 Oberman, supra note 15, at 48.
114 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.
115 Id. at 2184.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 2185-86.
118 See id. at 2185.
119 See id. at 2186.
120 See id. at 2185-86.
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Sotomayor expressly rejected the majority's conclusion that there was a
constitutionally significant difference between the level of intrusion in-
herent in a blood test compared to a breath test. 121 Justice Sotomayor
relied on Missouri v. McNeely in her opinion, seemingly to remind the
majority that McNeely held that if an officer can secure a warrant while
transporting the suspect and preparing the test, "there would be no plau-
sible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement." 122
In applying the above rule from McNeely, Justice Sotomayor argued
that the delay inherent in conducting a breath test usually provides police
ample time to secure a warrant.12 3 For example, officers must observe
the suspect for fifteen to twenty minutes before administering the breath
test to ensure that residual mouth alcohol, which can inflate results and
undermine the validity of the test at trial, has dissipated. 124 Justice
Sotomayor noted that if one considers the time it takes to transport the
suspect to the equipment site and to set up the breathalyzer machine,
breath tests typically require forty-five minutes to two hours to com-
plete. 125 Consequently, Justice Sotomayor argued that a categorical ex-
ception to the warrant requirement is inappropriate in this case. 126 Justice
Sotomayor would consider both breath and blood tests on a case-by-case
basis under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require-
ment, with the default rule being that both tests are unreasonable without
a warrant.127
Like Justice Sotomayor, Justice Thomas disagreed with the major-
ity's differentiation of blood and breath tests, calling the distinction an
"arbitrary line in the sand."'1 8 Unlike Justice Sotomayor, however, Jus-
tice Thomas believed that a search warrant is unnecessary in either in-
stance.' 29 Instead, Justice Thomas would apply a per se rule that both
warrantless blood and breath tests are constitutional because "the natural
metabolization of [BAC] creates an exigency once police have probable
cause to believe the driver is drunk." 130 Justice Thomas argued that his
121 Oberman, supra note 15, at 49.
122 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2193 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561
(2013)).
123 See id. at 2191.
124 Id. at 2192.
125 Id.; see also State v. Chirpich, 392 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Minn. App. 1986). While BAC
procedures vary from state to state, many states, including Minnesota, require officers to give
the suspect a window of time within which the suspect can contact an attorney before undergo-
ing the test. Breathalyzer machines can take a considerable amount of time to set-up; North
Dakota's Intoxilyzer 8000 machine can take as long as thirty minutes to "warm-up."
126 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2195-96.
127 See id.; Oberman, supra note 15, at 49.
128 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2197 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129 See id. at 2198.
130 Id. at 2198 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1576 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).
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approach does a better a job at conveying predicable rules to law en-
forcement officers than the majority's approach, which he believed
leaves the law in a "confused and unstable state."'
131
III. IMPACT OF BIRCHFIELD
A. Two Views of Criminal Procedure
Traditionally, the way the Court and society have viewed the pur-
pose of criminal procedure has fallen into two distinct paradigms. Under
one view, the purpose is to effectively separate the "us" from the
"them"-the good citizen from the criminal. 132 Proponents of this view
believe the criminal justice system should stigmatize and impose a new
social status on most criminal defendants, effectively reducing an indi-
vidual defendant to a symbol of moral wrong. 133 In contrast, proponents
of the second view believe that the purpose of criminal procedure is to
protect the citizenry from an overzealous state; those who adhere to the
later view tend to believe that a carceral state exacerbates rather than
diminishes crime. 134 Based on their respective dissents in Birchfield, Jus-
tice Thomas most closely subscribes to the former view of criminal pro-
cedure, while Justice Sotomayor adheres to the latter.
The Birchfield majority, however, seemed to jump back and forth
between the two views. On the one hand, the Court focused on the de-
gree of intrusiveness of blood and breath tests, and in distinguishing the
former from the latter, expressed concern about the potential for the gov-
ernment to abuse its power and retain a blood sample for improper
use.1 35 In this instance, the Court seemed to believe that it must protect
motorists from an overreaching government. On the other hand, the
Court declined to curtail implied consent laws outside of the specific
context of those laws that impose criminal sanctions for refusing a blood
draw. 136 The Court instead stressed the government's compelling interest
in combating drunk driving, arguing that civil sanctions such as license
suspension are inadequate to persuade dangerous, repeat drunk drivers to
cooperate. 137 By emphasizing the risks associated with particularly dan-
gerous offenders, the Court apparently believes that the criminal justice
system should separate the "us"-law abiding drivers-from the
131 Id. at 2197-98.
132 This view was particularly popular in the 1980s-90s, during the height of the War on
Drugs.
133 WERNER J. EINSTADTER & STUART HENRY, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: AN ANALYSIS
OF ITS UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 228-29 (2006).
134 See id.
135 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016). See also Oberman, supra note 15, 48
(2016).
136 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185-86.
137 See id. at 2179.
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"them"-dangerous drunk drivers. Depending on how the composition
of the Court continues to change under the Trump administration, the
Court may further revert to the "us versus them" approach to criminal
procedure in future rulings.
B. Bodily Integrity and New Technology
In concluding her dissent, Justice Sotomayor voiced a fear that if the
Court continues down the road of expanding the permissible scope of
warrantless searches, "the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement will
become nothing more than a suggestion." 138 Justice Sotomayor's worry
of a downward spiral regarding the warrant requirement is certainly legit-
imate in an age where government agencies collect internet communica-
tions139 and "bulk data from the telephone calls of virtually every
American" 14°-all without first securing a warrant. The very concept of
bodily integrity seems to be fading in constitutional analysis; although
the Court at least mentioned the phrase once in McNeely, observing that
an invasion of "bodily integrity implicates an individual's most personal
and deep-rooted expectations of privacy," 141 the phrase was not used in
Birchfield.
Although Justice Sotomayor acknowledged the possible negative
consequences of expanding exceptions to the warrant requirement, her
reasoning may become moot in the upcoming years, partially because of
Birchfield. Justice Sotomayor correctly pointed out that breath tests are
presently conducted not at the time of arrest, but rather at a separate
location forty minutes to two hours after the arrest. 142 Justice Sotomayor
argued that this fact "alone should be reason to reject an exception[" 143
Yet, this may no longer be the case after Birchfield. Prior to Birchfield,
many police departments relied solely on blood testing because the avail-
able breathalyzer machines were expensive, their reliability was under
scrutiny, and too few machines were available at breath-testing sites. 144
138 Id. at 2196.
139 See Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data From
Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-intemet-
companies-in-broad-secret-prograni/2013/06/06/3aOcOda8-cebf- 1 Ie2-8845-d970ccb04497_sto
ry.html?utmterm=.a388a9618043. This article refers to the NSA's now-infamous PRISM
program, which was revealed to the public by Edward Snowden.
140 Pete Williams, Massive NSA Phone Data Collection to Cease, NBC NEWS (Nov. 27,
2015, 10:58 PM), http://www.nbcnews.comnews/us-news/massive-nsa-phone-data-collection-
cease-n470521.
141 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013).
142 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2196.
143 Id.
144 David J. Shrager, Birchfield Ruling Disrupts Longstanding DUI Procedures, 18 LAW-
YERS J. 5, 5 (2016).
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After Birchfield, there will be a greater incentive to develop cheaper and
more accurate breathalyzer machines. In fact, Swedish scientists have
already designed a breathalyzer that can detect twelve different con-
trolled substances, including methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, mor-
phine and marijuana. 145
C. How will the States Respond to Birchfield?
1. Predictions
Prior to Birchfield, individual states used criminal penalties in sev-
eral distinct ways to encourage suspected drunk drivers to consent to
chemical testing. Some states, including both North Dakota and Minne-
sota, codified a separate criminal offense for refusing to undergo chemi-
cal testing. 146 As discussed above, Birchfield held that criminal sanctions
are unconstitutional for refusing a warrantless blood test, but are an ac-
ceptable form of punishment for refusing a warrantless breath test.
147
Birchfield, however, did not directly address the approach taken by sev-
eral other states, including Pennsylvania, which indirectly impose crimi-
nal penalties for refusing to undergo a BAC test.148
The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code establishes a three-tiered system for
DUI offenses where the penalties for the crime depend on the defen-
dant's BAC and number of prior DUI convictions.149 Prior to Birchfield,
police officers in Pennsylvania informed suspected drunk drivers that if
they refused to submit to chemical testing (usually a blood test),1 50 and
are later convicted of or plead guilty to a DUI offense, they would be
regarded as having BACs in the highest tier for sentencing. 151 For exam-
ple, before Birchfield, someone accused of a first-offense DUI who re-
fused a blood draw would face a mandatory seventy-two-hours
imprisonment, a one-year license suspension, and a minimum $1,000
fine.'52 After Birchfield, that same individual would likely risk no jail
145 Jason Koebler, New Breathalyzer Can Detect Marijuana, Cocaine, Heroin, U.S.
NEWS, (Apr. 25, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/0 4/ 2 5/new-
breathalyzer-can-detect-marijuana-cocaine-heroin.
146 N. D. CENT. CODE ANN. §39-20-01(3)(a) (2016); MINN. STAT. §169A.51, subdiv. 2
(2014).
147 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185-86.
148 See Shrager, supra note 144, at 5.
149 Id.; DUI & DWI in Pennsylvania, DMV, http://www.dmv.org/pa-pennsylvania/auto-
motive-law/dui.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) ; 75 PA.C.S. § 3802 (2006), http://www
.legis.state.pa.us/WUOI/LI/LI/CT/HTMI75/00.038.002.000..htm.
150 Shrager, supra note 144, at 5. Since 2013, the Pennsylvania State Police, as well as
many municipal police departments, have relied solely on blood testing because the breath
machines they previously used were expensive and their reliability was under scrutiny.
151 Id.; see 75 PA.C.S. § 1547 (2006).
152 Zachary B. Cooper, Supreme Court Ruling To Have Major Impact On DUI Cases,
PENN. DUI L. BLOG (July 5, 2016), http://www.pennsylvaniaduilawyersblog.com/2016/0 7 /05/
supreme-court-ruling-major-impact-dui-cases/.
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time or license suspension if the responding officer did not secure a war-
rant before requesting the blood draw. 153
States may worry that Birchfield will hinder their ability to effec-
tively respond to drunk driving. Yet, the Court expressly approved the
general concept of implied consent laws and only rejected criminal sanc-
tions as a punishment for refusal of a blood draw. 154 Thus, states can
seemingly get around Birchfield in several ways. First, states can simply
increase the severity of civil sanctions that drunk driving suspects face
for refusing to undergo a blood draw. For example, states can either in-
crease the length of the suspect's license suspension or the amount of the
fine. Second, states that rely primarily on blood tests can shift to breath
tests for routine DUI stops. Last, states that choose to still rely on both
tests can simply amend their implied consent statutes to remove the
threat of increased criminal sanctions for blood draws, but still retain the
same language for breath tests.
A police officer does not need a warrant if the suspect consents to
the search, and consent searches comprise more than 90% of warrantless
searches. 155 Police officers will likely rely even more on consent to con-
duct a warrantless blood draw after Birchfield. Prior to Birchfield, a sig-
nificant majority of motorists suspected of drunk driving voluntarily
consented to breath tests, even in states that did not impose criminal pen-
alties for refusal.' 56 Only 21% and 12% of people refused breath tests in
North Dakota and Minnesota, respectively, prior to Birchfield; including
states that impose only civil penalties for refusal, the average refusal rate
between the states is only 24%. 157 Part of the reason that so many people
consent to both BAC tests and other forms of searches is that police
officers are specially trained to obtain consent during traffic stops. 158 Not
only can the police employ a wide variety of psychological tactics to
induce the suspect to consent, but a person, especially one who is inebri-
ated, is likely to submit to the apparent authority of the responding police
officer. 59 Thus, police officers will likely receive even more training in
regards to how to effectively obtain consent for blood draws, and war-
rantless searches-by-consent will continue to be widely relied-upon by
the police.
153 Id.
154 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185-86 (2016).
155 Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA.
L. REv. 509, 511 (2015), http://www.floridalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/7-Burke.pdf.
156 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2193.
157 Id.
158 See CHARLES R. Epp, ET AL., PULLED OVER: How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND
CITIZENSHIP 37-39 (2014).
159 Id.
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2. Recent Developments
A separate concern is whether police officers understand the state of
the law after Birchfield. Based on the July 2017 incident involving Nurse
Alex Wubbels, which garnered national media attention, at least some
government officials are still confused about what the law regarding war-
rantless blood tests is. 160 Wubbels, a former Olympic skier, was perform-
ing her duties as the head nurse of the University of Utah's burn unit,
when Detective Jeff Payne sought to obtain a blood sample from an un-
conscious patient. 161 The patient was a victim in a fatal truck crash, and
he himself was not charged with a crime. 162 Despite this, Payne de-
manded that he be allowed to secure a blood sample, referring to "im-
plied consent law" and "exigent circumstances."' 16 3 Wubbels refused
Payne's request, informing him that under hospital policy, Payne could
not collect a blood sample unless he first arrested the patient, secured a
warrant for the blood draw, or received the patient's consent. 164 In re-
sponse, the officer arrested Wubbels. 165 Although Wubbels was soon re-
leased and never charged with a crime, her arrest sparked national
outrage. 166 Ultimately, Wubbels settled for $500,000 with the Salt Lake
City Police Department. 167
The commentary following Wubbels' arrest demonstrates that many
people, even legal scholars, are still confused over what the state of the
law is. Amy Swearer, a visiting legal fellow at the Meese Center for
Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation, suggests that in
order to perform a blood draw, Payne needed to secure a warrant, receive
consent from the patient, or arrest the patient, in which case the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement would apply. 168 In
contrast, Paul Cassell, the Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of
Criminal Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of
Utah, argues that because Utah's implied consent law only imposes civil
penalties (such as driver's license suspension), the law is still constitu-
160 See Faith Karimi & Artemis Moshtaghian, Utah Nurse's Arrest Violated Policies, In-
vestigation Shows, CNN (Sept. 15, 2017 12:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/14/health/
utah-nurse-salt-lake-officers-internal-investigation/index.html.
161 Amy Swearer, Utah Blood Draw Incident Shows the Limits of Police Authority, THE
DAILY SIGNAL (Sept. 6, 2017), http://dailysignal.com/2017/09/06/utah-blood-draw-incident-
shows-limits-police-authority/.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 See id; see also Karimi, supra note 160.
167 Simone Francis, Utah Nurse at Center of Controversial Arrest Announces $500K Set-
tlement, GOoD4UTAH (Oct. 31, 2017, 6:16 PM), http://www.good4utah.com/news/local-news/
utah-nurse-at-center-of-controversial-arrest-announces-500000-settlement/848569559.
168 Swearer, supra note 161.
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tional after Birchfield.169 Yet, Cassell admits that even if Utah's current
implied consent law is constitutional, the law still did not permit Payne
to perform the blood draw. 170 Utah's implied consent law permits an
officer to only extract blood from a person the officer reasonably be-
lieves drove "while in violation of' the laws regarding driving under the
influence of alcohol or other substances. 171 Here, the unconscious patient
was the victim, and the officer did not believe that the patient was driv-
ing under the influence. 172
D. Alternatives to Implied Consent Laws to Combat Drunk Driving
Although the Supreme Court declined to invalidate implied consent
laws in Birchfield, several state supreme courts have held that such laws
violate the Fourth Amendment.173 Many state courts throughout the
country prior to Birchfield have generally upheld warrantless BAC tests
under the exigent circumstances exception, not consent.174 For example,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals explained in 2012 that, "When the re-
quirements of probable cause and exigent circumstances are met, consent
is not constitutionally necessary." 175 In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
v. Kohl, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that the govern-
ment does have a "compelling interest" in combating drunk driving. 176
Nevertheless, the court held that "[t]he protections afforded to individu-
als under the Pennsylvania Constitution may not be diminished ... by
the Commonwealth's vigilance in promoting that interest." 177 Kohl raises
the following question: how else can the government combat drunk
driving?
One approach is to have a device installed in every motorist's car
which would measure the driver's BAC and prevent the car from starting
if the BAC was above the legal limit. The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) has encouraged the development of DADSS-driver al-
cohol detection system for safety-an in-vehicle technology that aims to
unobtrusively check the BAC of all drivers, through either touch or
breath. 178 Although the NTSB acknowledged that the technology was
169 Paul Cassel, Paul Cassell: Cop who Arrested Nurse was Wrong, but the Law is Com-
plicated, TIE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/commen-
tary/2017/09/01/paul-cassell-cop-who-arrested-nurse-was-wrong-but-the-law-is-complicated/.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Clark, supra note 33, at 106.
174 Id.
175 Id. (quoting State v. Wiseman, 816 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)).
176 615 A.2d 308, 316 (Pa. 1992).
177 Id.
178 Mike M. Ahlers, NTSB Looks to Technology to End Drunken Driving in the U.S.,
CNN, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/us/ntsb-drunken-driving/.
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years away from perfecting, the board remains optimistic that this devel-
opment could one day virtually end drunk driving. 179
Seventeen states already require motorists who have previously
been convicted of drunk driving to have an ignition interlock device in-
stalled in their cars, which prevents a car's engine from starting until a
breath sample is analyzed.180 The NTSB recommends that all fifty states
require ignition interlock devices for any driver previously convicted of a
DUI even once. 181 One of the problems with this approach is that the
public views such devices as burdensome and intrusive. Furthermore, re-
quiring all motorists, including those with no prior criminal record, to
have such devices installed would raise serious constitutional concerns.
Ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft may also help reduce
the number of drunk driving accidents. Since Uber began operating in
New York City in May 2011, drunk driving accidents have decreased by
25 to 35 percent.182 Other studies, however, have not replicated these
results, at least in part because appreciably more people drive than use
ride-sharing services. 183 Still, greater use of ride-sharing services in the
future should positively correlate with fewer people drinking and
driving. 184
Yet another, perhaps more long-term approach to combat the dan-
gers of drunk driving, is to invest in the concept of self-driving cars.
Several prominent companies, including Google, Apple, Tesla, and Gen-
eral Motors, have already begun developing and testing such vehicles. 185
Although the prospect of widely-available self-driving cars is certainly
exciting, the technology is years away from being made publically avail-
able. Although self-driving cars could theoretically eliminate drunk driv-
ing in the distant future, they will likely also create novel liabilities for
manufacturers, owners, and operators of such vehicles. 186
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Jessica Lynn Peck, New York City Drunk Driving After Uber 19 (CUNY Graduate
CR. Ph.D. Program in EcON. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13, 2017), http://wfs.gc.cuny
.edulEconomics/RePEc/cgc/wpaper/CUNYGC-WP013.pdf.
183 See Jacey Fortin, Does Uber Really Prevent Drunken Driving? It Depends on the
Study, N.Y. Tvmvs, Apr. 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/business/uber-drunk-
driving-prevention.html.
184 See id.
185 Heather Smith, Are self-driving cars legal? And if so, can I drive home drunk in one?,
GR ST, Jan. 15, 2016, http://grist.orgfbusiness-technology/are-self-driving-cars-legal-and-if-so-
can-i-drive-home-drunk-in-one/.
186 See Joe Manna, How Autonomous Vehicles Can Help Reduce Drunk Driving, LocAL
MOTORS, (2016), https://launchforth.io/blog/post/how-autonomous-vehicles-can-help-reduce-
drunk-driving/1998/.
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CONCLUSION
Birchfield v. North Dakota is a landmark decision that will influ-
ence criminal procedure jurisprudence for years to come. Birchfield drew
a distinction between the level of intrusiveness inherent in a breath test
versus a blood test, upholding warrantless searches incident to a DUI
arrest involving the former, but not the latter. In addition, the Court ruled
that criminal penalties for refusing to consent to a blood draw were un-
constitutional, but such penalties were an acceptable punishment for mo-
torists who refused to undergo a breath test. Because Birchfield failed to
establish a clear rule regarding the permissible scope of implied consent
laws, the Court will plausibly revisit them in the future.
Although the full impact of Birchfield cannot be predicted, it will
likely be at most a minimal hindrance to the states' ability to effectively
combat drunk driving. Police departments will likely rely more on breath
tests, which will incentivize the development of cheaper and more accu-
rate breathalyzer machines. Police will continue to largely rely on con-
sent to conduct various warrantless searches, including both blood draws
and breath tests. In summary, the majority's decision in Birchfield was a
compromise, and one that will unlikely satisfy either side of the debate.
Drunk driving remains as serious a concern as before Birchfield was de-
cided. More than ten thousand people lost their lives as a result of drunk
driving in 2016.187 New technology, rather than new or stricter laws,
may provide the best hope to curtail the tragic consequences of drunk
driving in the future.
187 NHTSA, supra note 4.
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